Since the late 1960s, however, the emergence of pressures for social change from "new" social movements drawing support primarily from members of the educated middle class has brought forth a series of theoretical arguments about the receptiveness of various segments of the middle class to liberal political appeals. Some of these arguments emphasize the role of material interests in an expanded public sector in disposing them to support or participate in struggles for social change (Bruce-Briggs 1979; Gouldner 1979), while others point to changing values (Inglehart 1990; Clark 1994 ). The resurgence of conservative political and economic trends in the Anglo-American democracies during the 1980s, however, has led to a revival of the classical view (Goldthorpe 1982 (Goldthorpe , 1995 Derber, Schwartz, and Magrass 1990; Reich 1991; Brint 1994 ). Analyzing the ways in which the economic dependence of middle-class professionals and managers gives them a material stake in the status quo, these analysts suggest that only a relatively small fraction of the middle class is susceptible to liberal or left political alignments.
In our previous analysis of class voting in the United States since World War II (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995), we found evidence of a significant Democratic voting trend since the 1960s among one core middle-class segment-professionals-but not others. Those results raise important but as yet unanswered questions about the thesis of conservative retrenchment among the middle class. The main panel of Figure 1 summarizes these earlier findings. The trend lines presented in this figure are the predicted logits of choosing the Democratic over the Republican presidential candidate, and they are derived from a model of vote choice that has been fitted to data from the National Election Studies. Insofar as this model documents but does not explain those trends, we term it the "initial" model. The solid line in the main panel shows the Democratic turn among professionals; the dashed line illustrates the absence of any such trend among managers during the same period.' Whereas managers remain a dependable Republican constituency in presidential elections, professionals increasingly support Democratic candidates.
Taking into consideration that the y-axis in Figure 1 represents the log-odds of choosing the Democratic candidate, the trend line for professionals crosses the zero-point on the xaxis (which translates into a probability of .5) in 1972, showing that this election year marks the point after which professionals are predicted as moving decisively away from their historic pattern of support for Republican candidates. The magnitude of the Democratic voting trend among professionals can be gauged by examining the difference between the logits for the first and last elections in the series: Between 1948 and 1992, professionals' (predicted) tendency to vote Democratic increased by nearly a full logit (an increase from a probability of .35 to .60). In sum, professionals have moved from being the most Republican class in the 1950s to the second most Democratic of the six classes we analyzed by 1992 (see Hout et al. 1995) .
These findings have significant implications for the debates about the political alignments of the middle class. Managers' voting behavior situates them in a stable, conservative alignment with the Republican Party, as the classical view would suggest. Professionals, however, have undergone a realignment with the Democratic Party since the 1960s. The latter development has been missed in scholarly debates over middle-class politics in the United States because class has largely disappeared from analyses of voting, with research instead focusing instead on policy attitudes or participation in social movements.
In this paper, we develop a systematic analysis of the voting patterns summarized in Figure 1 . We address two questions: (1) What factor(s) account for political realignment among professionals after 1968? (2) What factor(s) account for the electoral differences between professionals and managers that have emerged during this period? The smaller, embedded chart in Figure 1 summarizes the direction in which our analyses proceed. The angled trend line in this chart shows the Democratic voting trend among professionals for the critical 1972 to 1992 period. As before, this trend line has been derived from our initial model of middleclass voting (which includes no explanatory variables). The two remaining bold lines, by contrast, are derived from the preferred model which includes explanatory variables (discussed later in this paper). The bold line for professionals' vote choice is now flat and congruent with the bold, dashed line for managers, showing that the additional effects parameterized in our preferred model have explained away both professionals' voting trend and their electoral differences with managers.
In the remainder of the paper, we present the steps by which we arrive at the preferred model's estimates and discuss the answers they provide to our two research questions. In the first part of the paper, we review re- 3 These categories are a modified version of Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) five-class scheme. The principal occupational titles coded as "professional" include accountants, architects, computer programmers, engineers, statisticians, physical scientists, physicians, dentists, teachers, lawyers and judges, librarians, reporters, writers and editors. Additional details about coding schemes are available from the authors on request. 4 We limit our analysis to professionals and managers for several reasons. First, although some employment conditions of routine whitecollar workers are similar to those of professionals or managers, there are also many important differences that place them, at best, in a "contradictory class location" (Wright 1978 (Wright , 1985 . Routine white-collar workers typically do not possess the same degree of autonomy and discretion in their work as do professionals and managers items makes it an ideal data set for our purposes. The items required for our analysis are available beginning with the 1972 election study, and thus our analysis is limited to the period including the 1972 through the 1992 presidential elections. However, because 1972 marks the point at which professionals' voting trend matures (with professionals' expected probability of favoring the Democratic Party candidate crossing the .5 threshold), the available data provide a sufficient basis for making inferences about the phenomena under investigation. We analyze two variables as indicators of the economic bases of voting behavior. These two variables are dichotomous; they are extracted from a trichotomous item asking respondents to assess their current economic situation in comparison to the past year. The reference category of these dummy variables is the assessment "better than a year ago." Negative economic assessments can provide individuals with reason to vote against the incumbent president and to test whether those occurring during Republican presidencies explain the Democratic voting trend among professionals, we coded the item measuring dissatisfaction to apply to the five election years in which the incumbent president was a Republican (1972, 1976, 1984, 1988, and 1992) .
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Variables
The next block of variables relates to the ideological bases of politics, and specifically to attitudes towards two types of issues: views of the state and views of social issues. The first state item refers to an ideal-typical attribute of the modern welfare state-the provision of jobs and a guaranteed standard of living. This item allows us to evaluate the "symbolic" version of the new class thesis. If this version of the thesis is supported, the six dummy variables for the 7-point welfare state item should help explain the differences in vote choice between professionals and managers as well as the Democratic realignment among professionals. A second state item asks whether the federal government is-as predicted by the "new political culture" thesis-viewed by citizens as too powerful. We use this dichotomous item to evaluate a claim advanced by the new political culture thesis, that the relationship between social liberalism and views of governmental power is a negative one.
The next block of variables measures attitudes toward three social issues: abortion, the civil rights movement, and gender equality. The abortion item is coded "1" for the prochoice response and "O" otherwise.5 The (Goldthorpe 1982 ). Second, although the self-employed are often considered part of the "middle class" in American political discourse (e.g., the "old middle class" in Mills civil rights item is a three-category item asking whether the civil rights movement is moving too fast, about right, or too slow, while the gender equality item is a sevenpoint scale asking whether women and men should have equal roles in the family and workplace. We analyze these respectively as a pair and as a set of six dummy variable contrasts. Change in the marginal distributions of responses to these social issue items is large and moves in a liberal direction, highlighting the possibility raised by the new political culture thesis, that attitudes toward social issues explain trends in, and differences between, the voting behavior of professionals and managers.
Two final items in our analyses relate to two separate dimensions of partisanship: partisan affect (the tendency to positively or negatively evaluate each major party), and party identification (the tendency to identify with one [or neither] of the two major parties). Our measure of partisan affect is dichotomous, coded "1" if respondents give any positive evaluations of the Democratic Party in the NES's open-ended party evaluation items and "0" if they do not (see Wattenberg 1994 for related work). Our second measure is the classic Michigan seven-point scale that taps the strength and direction of party identification. As with our other polychotomous items, we treat the party identification item as a set of six non-redundant dummy variable contrasts for the seven categories (these range from strong Republican to strong Democrat).
The two partisanship items provide additional information about the nature and stability of middle-class political (re)alignments. If the Democratic voting trend among professionals has led to a stable partisan realignment, the inclusion of the two items in the model should explain a sizable portion of their voting trend (and their growing differences with managers). This is a critical issue in light of the centrality of partisanship to voting behavior (Campbell et al. [1960] 1980; Miller and Shanks 1996), for if professionals' voting trend has occurred independently of their partisan attitudes, it suggests a far less durable attachment to (and thus realignment with) the Democratic Party. By contrast, if we find that the effect of the causal factors explaining middle-class vote choice are mediated by a change in partisanship, it suggests a more lasting political realignment.
To this end, we first fit a preferred model of middle-class vote choice that omits the two partisanship items in order to estimate the total (direct + indirect) effects of our explanatory factors. We then refit the preferred model with the partisanship items, deriving estimates of the (direct) contribution of our earlier factors and of the partisanship factors to explaining trends and differences in vote choice among the middle class. This procedure allows us to make inferences about the extent to which the effect of the causal mechanisms of middle-class voting are mediated by (changes or differences in) partisanship among professionals and managers.
Logistic Regression Models of Vote Choice
We choose a logistic specification because of our dichotomous dependent variable. To answer these questions, we use two regression decompositions (Teixeira 1987; Firebaugh 1997 ). In the first of these, we decompose the 1972 to 1992 voting trend among professionals into its components. The second decomposes the differences between professionals' and managers' vote choice during the entire 1972 to 1992 period. For both decompositions, we multiply the sample mean for the relevant group in the analysis by the appropriate regression coefficient. By converting this product into a percentage of the total predicted logit, we can directly compare the respective contribution of each explanatory factor. Table 1 Model 7 is derived from Model 6 by deleting the interaction term for the linear voting trend among professionals. The strong improvement in fit (BIC difference = -6) shows that the voting trend among professionals (and also their differences from managers) is explained away by the independent variables in the model.8 Model 7 is thus our preferred model that does not control for the effects of partisan attitudes and we use its coefficients to estimate the (total) contribution of each sociodemographic, economic, and ideological variable to explaining trends and differences in middle-class vote choice. However, the decisive improvement in fit of Model 8 over Model 7 demonstrates that the partisanship variables also have a significant impact on vote choice. Model 8 is thus our preferred model that controls for partisanship, and we use its coefficients to reestimate the (direct) contribution of each variable to explaining trends and differences in middle-class vote choice. By comparing the two sets of estimates obtained under Models 7 and 8, we can answer the causal question of whether the political effects of sociodemographic, economic and ideological factors are mediated by corresponding changes in partisan attitudes. This enables us to derive an informative picture of the issue-based versus partisanship-based nature of professionals' political realignment in the 1972 to 1992 period.
RESULTS
Decomposing the Sources of Trends and Differences in Middle-Class Vote Choice
The factors parameterized in our preferred models fully explain away the trend in professionals' vote choice and their differences from managers. We now enlarge upon these analyses by decomposing the two sets of regression results. We consider first the decomposition of the regression results for explaining professionals' Democratic voting trend, using the gender item's coefficient for Model 7 (.168) to illustrate this procedure.9 The sample mean for the gender item in 1992 for professionals is .377. Multiplying the coefficient by this mean (.168 x .377) yields a product of .063. We then multiply the coefficient by the professionals' mean in 1972 (.168 x .415) to obtain the second product, .070. Subtracting the second product from the first, we obtain a rounded estimate of -.01, which is the estimated effect (in logits) that change in the gender composition of professionals has on their likelihood of choosing the Democratic candidate. We apply this type of calculation for each of the independent variables to obtain the results presented in column 1 of Table 2 9 Due to space considerations, we do not present the coefficients or sample means for professionals and managers. These are available from authors on request. Of the remaining independent variables, the economic variables have a modest, positive impact, explaining 6 percent of the overall trend. The corresponding estimate for change in professionals' views of the power of the federal government is 10 percent. This result establishes that increasingly favorable views of state power led professionals to support the more liberal of the two major parties. By contrast, the -15 logit/-29 percent estimates for the welfare state item reveal a trend away from support for the welfare state. During the same period in which professionals have become more liberal on social issues and less hostile to government in general, they have also become more conservative with respect to social provision.
To this point, our results do not analyze the role that partisanship may play in explaining professionals' vote choice. In column 3 of Table 2 , we use the coefficients from Model 8 to reestimate our decomposition to take into account the effects of professionals' party identification and their partisan affect toward the Democratic Party. Column 3 presents the percentage of the total logit change that each independent variable explains net of change in partisan attitudes. By comparing columns 2 and 3, we thus measure the extent to which the sources of professionals' voting trend according to Model 7's results are mediated by changes in partisanship attitudes.
Most of the effects of economic and sociodemographic change (as well as changing views of the welfare state) are mediated by partisan change. Whereas the sociodemographic variables explain -37 percent of the total predicted change in vote choice not controlling for partisanship, they explain only -10 percent when partisanship is taken into account in Model 8. Likewise, the -29 percent estimate for the welfare state variable declines to -4 percent when the partisan variables are included in Model 8. Overall, change in partisan attitudes, due in large part to the increased proportion of professionals who identify themselves as "strong Democrats," explains 55 percent of the total change in vote choice. Because changing attitudes toward social issues account for just over 50 percent of the total predicted logit change in Model 8, a substantial portion of their effect (in Model 7) remains unexplained, having occurred entirely outside the realm of partisanship. These results suggest that the incorporation of social issues into political partisanship has been incomplete, especially when compared to the congruent patterns of change in welfare state and partisan attitudes.
The preceding results imply the following causal picture of professionals' realignment. Increasingly liberal views on social issues have led to increasing support for Democratic presidential candidates, in part because greater social liberalism has disposed professionals to identify with, and endorse more positive views of the Democratic Party. Social issue liberalism has thus exerted a powerful effect on vote choice, part of which is direct and part indirect (mediated by changes in partisanship). Although it is logically possible to reverse the alternative causal inference (i.e., changing partisanship caused social liberalism to increase among professionals), this would raise the additional question of what force was responsible for professionals' shift in partisanship in the first place. Notice that this additional factor would have to explain not only the partisan shift, but also the relationship between social liberalism and vote choice among professionals. In light of professionals' conservative shift in their views of the welfare state (and the modest relationship between their changing voting behavior and personal economic evaluations), it is impossible to construe these factors as capable of explaining any Democratic political trends among professionals. Our inference, by contrast, provides a succinct and compelling answer to the causal question: Professionals' change in voting behavior is the result of their increasingly liberal views of social issues.10
Turning now to our second research question, we present in Table 3 We have systematically explored a number of competing hypotheses concerning the bases of middle-class political alignments, finding that liberal views on social issues have to this point driven professionals toward the Democratic Party. This novel result is difficult to integrate within existing theories of middle-class politics, for previous studies have largely ignored or downplayed the significance of social issue liberalism.12 For example, although Brint (1984 Brint ( , 1994 found greater levels of social liberalism among professionals, he placed much greater weight on conservative counter-trends during the 1980s in describing their political behavior. Jackman and Muha (1984) go even further, arguing not only that social liberalism among the middle class is of little political consequence, but also that liberal attitudes toward social issues are only superficially held. In an analysis of the future of the Democratic Party, Kuttner (1987) asserts that "to the extent that liberal positions on social issues have any effect, they push white working-class voters to the Republican column" (p. 112).
In contrast to such accounts, our analyses demonstrate that socially liberal attitudes have critical explanatory value in understanding important trends in middle-class political behavior. Not only does social issue liberalism explain the recent trends and differences in the voting behavior of professionals and managers, it has increased among professionals in both magnitude and to a more limited extent in political salience. We can think of no firmer demonstration of the specifically political importance of socially liberal attitudes than a strong association with vote choice in presidential elections. Moreover, liberal views on social issues such as abortion, women's roles, and civil rights are the principal reasons behind professionals' realignment with Democratic candidates and their widening differences vis-a-vis managers. Without this specific ideological base of support, our analyses show that Demo-I In related work (see Brooks and Manza 1996) , we have investigated further the significance of these developments for understanding change in the nature of class politics. These analyses show that changing views of social issues affect most classes in the same way (with the partial exception of professionals). As a result, the increasingly important political cleavage defined by social issues has not decreased the overall magnitude of the class cleavage. 12 In related work on religion and politics since the 1950s (see Manza and Brooks forthcoming), we have found that increases in liberal views of social issues have also been of consequence for some religious groups. cratic presidential candidates would have lost considerable ground among both segments of the middle class. Indeed, the net effect of marginal changes on the other independent variables in our analyses would have actually led to a reversal of professionals' Democratic voting trend in the post-1972 period.
Of the four theories of middle-class politics we have examined, only the new political culture thesis provides grounds for anticipating that attitudes toward social issues matter for understanding trends in middle-class political alignments. Our analyses provide general support for this claim. However, an important limitation of this thesis relates to its claims about the relationship between attitudes toward social issues and attitudes toward the state. Inglehart (1990) and Clark (1994) argue not only that Western publics have become more liberal on social issues, but also that the mechanisms producing this shift have led to a growing skepticism about the use of the federal government to solve social problems. In part, what makes the idea of a new political culture theoretically distinctive is the assumption that this "new" kind of liberalism is structurally incompatible and at odds with the "old" sort typified by the governmental activism and modest egalitarianism associated with the New Deal.
If this aspect of the new political culture thesis were true, we would expect the relationship between liberal positions on social issues and left positions on state/economic issues to be zero-sum. In other words, a socially liberal outlook should be associated with a fiscally conservative/individualistic view of the state/economy nexus. We examine whether this assumption is tenable in Table 4 , which presents pairwise correlations among the five attitudinal items in the analyses for managers and professionals. These correlations indicate that responses to the governmental power items are positively related to responses to the social issue items among professionals: Endorsing the liberal response on a given social issue item is correlated with rejecting the claim that the state has become too powerful. The same is true of the interrelationship between responses to the welfare state item and responses to the social issue items: Holding a liberal view on social issues is associated with greater support for the welfare state. Although the re- suits for managers show slightly fewer statistically significant correlations, they too cut against the new political culture thesis, for each of the latter is again positively signed. This is not to deny that the middle class (or professionals in particular) are economically conservative, for inspection of changes on the relevant item shows that since 1972 they have become increasingly likely to oppose the welfare state. Nevertheless professionals' growing social liberalism and their ebbing support for the welfare state do not appear to be aspects of the same ideological trend. Moreover, the positive sum results of our correlational analysis suggest that the "old" left and the "new" liberalism are complementary (or at least not contradictory) in their relationship to one another (Brooks and Manza 1994 ).
Social Issues and Partisan Realignment
The concept of a political realignment (Key 1959; Nardulli 1995) provides a useful means of understanding the long-term shift in voting behavior among professionals, a shift which is particularly remarkable when viewed from the perspective of their solidly Republican voting pattern in the 1950s (see Hout et al. 1995) . Had professionals' voting trend occurred independently of change in partisan attitudes, we could view it as a purely cultural phenomenon, perhaps incapable of supporting a more lasting realignment. However, our analysis of the mediating role of partisanship suggests that changing views of social issues have contributed to change in both party identification and partisan affect. The mediation of the impact of social liberalism on professionals' vote choice implies that attitudes on social issues are distinctive not only for their explanatory impact, but also for the way in which they have been partially absorbed by-and thus have contributed to-new partisan alignments.
Our analyses also demonstrate that professionals are an economically conservative segment of the electorate whose increasingly inegalitarian views of the welfare state would otherwise have pushed them toward the Republican rather than the Democratic Party. Changes in their sociodemographic composition would also have moved them back to a conservative alignment. These results highlight the importance of social issue liberalism, showing it to be the single mechanism that can effectively counteract the conservative thrust of these previous factors. While professionals report increases in personal economic dissatisfaction, our analyses reveal that their dissatisfaction has had a minimal payoff for Democratic candidates. To date, increased liberalism on social issues has been sufficient to drive a wedge through the middle class and move professionals out of their earlier Republican alignment. However, the political impact of social issues is an ongoing process, and one whose institutionalization within the party system is as yet incomplete. 
Clem Brooks is
